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INVASION OF PRIVACY BY INTRUSION:
DIETEMANN v. TIME, INC.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has handed
down the first decision in California allowing recovery for the tort of
invasion of privacy based on an intrusion.2 In a far reaching opinion,
the court held in Dietemann v. Time, Inc.3 that under California law
a cause of action for the invasion of privacy was established where em-
ployees of defendant, by subterfuge, gained entrance to plaintiff's home
and without his consent photographed him and electronically recorded
and transmitted his conversation, as a result of which he suffered emo-
tional distress. The court dispensed with the necessity of proving
publication, the existence of a technical trespass, or special damages.
A.A. Dietemann, a disabled veteran with little education, was en-
gaged in the practice of healing with clay, minerals and herbs, which
was characterized by the district court as "simple quackery."'4  Con-
ducting his activities in his own home, he did not advertise, had no
1. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
2. Dean William Prosser has analyzed privacy as being composed of four distinct
kinds of invasion, including intrusion, appropriation (see, e.g., Fairfield v. American
Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955)), public disclosure
of private facts (see, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34,
93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971)), and false light in the public eye (see, e.g., Briscoe).
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804-14 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER]; Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389-409 (1960). The California
Supreme Court, in Briscoe, stated that false light in the public eye is just a euphemism
for libel. 4 Cal. 3d at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876. Therefore, since the
Briscoe decision, there may be only three forms of invasion of privacy in California.
Dean Prosser's analysis is embodied in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A
(Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967). However, Professor Bloustein has suggested a
more expansive concept of the right of privacy, extending to any affront to human
dignity. See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962 (1964); Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the
Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46
TEXAS L. Rnv. 611 (1968). Bloustein's privacy tort would seem to allow recovery for
such wrongs as battery, assault, false imprisonment, defamation, malicious prosecution,
and especially intentional infliction of emotional distress. And see Wade, Defamation
and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093, 1124-25 (1962), where the author
seems to suggest approaching the right of privacy from the standpoint of the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. For further comparison between Prosser and
Bloustein, see Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. RE V. 34, 46-54 (1967).
3. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
4. Id. at 245. The facts in the opinion of the court of appeals are quoted verbatim
from Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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telephone, and accepted only contributions for his services.5 Diete-
mann had already come under the scrutiny of law enforcement officials
who had themselves on two previous occasions made recordings of con-
versations in Dietemann's home.6 However, despite these recordings,
the District Attorney's Office entered into an arrangement with Life
magazine, a publication of Time, Inc., whereby Life's employees agreed
to visit Dietmann's home and obtain pictures and further recordings
of his activities. The information obtained from the visit would be used
as evidence to prosecute Dietemann and could later be used by Life
for publication.
7
Two employees of Life, Mrs. Jackie Metcalf and Mr. William Ray,
went to Dietemann's home on September 20, 1963, where they were ad-
mitted by falsely claiming to have been recommended for treatment by a
friend. They accompanied Dietemann into his den, where they observed
equipment which the district court described as "gadgets." Mrs. Metcalf
told Dietemann that she had a lump on her breast, and after looking
at some of his "gadgets" and waving his wand, he concluded that she
had eaten some rancid butter 11 years, 9 months and 7 days before.8
During the examination, Dietemann was photographed by Mr. Ray
with a hidden camera. The conversations were transmitted by a radio
transmitter hidden in Mrs. Metcalf's purse to a tape recorder in an au-
tomobile occupied by another Life employee, a member of the District
Attorney's Office, and an investigator for the State Department of Pub-
lic Health. On October 15, 1963, Dietemann was arrested at his
home "'on a charge of practicing medicine without a license in viola-
tion of Section 26280, California Health and Safety Code.'" Two
weeks later, before Dietemann had entered any plea in the case, Life
magazine published an article entitled "Crackdown on Quackery," 10
which depicted Dietemann as a quack, and included one of the pictures
taken by Ray on September 20, 1963.11 Dietemann sued the publisher




9. Id., quoting Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 927 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
The factual narration seems to be erroneous, since § 26280 deals with adulterated or
misbranded drugs. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 26280 (West 1967). However,
Dietemann subsequently, on June 1, 1964, entered a plea of nolo contendere to vio-
lations of § 26280 and CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 2141 (West 1967) (practicing
medicine without a license), both of which were misdemeanors. 449 F.2d at 247. Diete-
mann did give out homemade concoctions of various herbs, minerals and clay.
10. LI E, Nov. 1, 1963, at 76.
11. 449 F.2d at 245-46.
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of Life, alleging that his right of privacy had been invaded.' 2
The United States District Court for the Central District of California,
placing itself in the position of the Supreme Court of California consid-
ering the matter initially,13 concluded that "[t]he publication in Life
Magazine . . . of plaintiff's picture taken without his consent in his
home" constituted an invasion of Dietemann's right to privacy under
California law.' 4 The court also held that Life's employees, acting as
agents of law enforcement officials under agreement with the District
Attorney's Office, had conducted a search and seizure in violation of
the Fourth Amendment,' 5 thereby entitling Dietemann to relief under
the Federal Civil Rights Act.' 6
On appeal, the court was presented with three issues: (1) Whether
under California law a cause of action for invasion of privacy was es-
tablished by proof of the facts alleged by Dietemann; (2) Whether the
First Amendment freedom of the press insulated the defendant from
liability for invasion of privacy because Life's employees acted for the
12. 284 F. Supp. at 928.
13. The complaint claimed diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
284 F. Supp. at 926. Under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73
(1938), a federal court, in a diversity action involving an alleged invasion of privacy,
will follow the law of the state where the purported invasion occurred in determining
whether to grant relief. Werner v. Hearst Publishing Co., 297 F.2d 145, 148 (9th
Cir. 1961). See also Gates v. P.F. Collier, Inc., 378 F.2d 888, 892 (9th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968); Man v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845,
846-47 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
14. 284 F. Supp. at 932. Dietemann was awarded one thousand dollars general
damages for injury to his feelings and peace of mind. It was also within the discre-
tion of the court to award exemplary damages; however, the court concluded that puni-
tive damages were not warranted since defendant's effort was directed toward elimina-
tion of quackery, an evil which the court stated "has visited great harm upon a great
number of gullible people." Id. at 932-33.
15. Id. at 931.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. 284 F. Supp. at 932. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The court of appeals stated that
"[a]lthough the complaint did not initially cite the Civil Rights Act as a foundation of
liability, the district court concluded that a claim for relief had been proved under the
Act," and "[oin appeal plaintiff pressed liability under the Act as an alternative basis
for supporting the judgment." 449 F.2d at 247 n.1.
NOTES
purpose of gathering material for a magazine story which was there-
after published utilizing some of the material gathered; and (3)
Whether Life's employees were acting as special agents of law enforce-
ment officials, and if so, whether their acts violated the United States
Constitution, thereby subjecting defendant to liability under. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.17
The court of appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Shirley M. Huf-
stedler,'8 held that a cause of action for invasion of privacy was estab-
lished under California law when Life magazine surreptitiously photo-
graphed Dietemann in his den and electronically recorded and trans-
mitted his conversation without his consent, thereby causing injury to
his feelings and peace of mind. The fact that such activity was done for
the purpose of newsgathering did not insulate the defendant from li-
ability, since the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First
Amendment19 does not immunize newsmen from liability for "torts
or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering."20  The
court did not, however, decide the question of liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.21 Because the plaintiff had proved a cause of action for an
invasion of his privacy and because the First Amendment did not pro-
tect the defendant, the court concluded it was unnecessary to consider
the Civil Rights Act question and consequently accepted the defend-
ant's disclaimer of any contention that "its employees were acting for or
on behalf of the police."22 Judge James M. Carter, in a concurring and
dissenting opinion, agreed with the majority's conclusions regarding the
viability of the cause of action under California tort law and the failure
to reach any issue under the federal Civil Rights Act, but felt the court
17. 449 F.2d at 247. As to the third issue, action apparently was not prosecuted
against the state officials, and the question of whether they would be liable to Diete-
mann under the Civil Rights Act was not presented.
18. District Judge Von Der Heydt of the District of Alaska, sitting by designation,
joined Circuit Judge Hufstedler in the majority opinion. 449 F.2d at 245.
19. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend I.
20. 449 F.2d at 249. The court felt it unnecessary to consider whether California
would adopt Prosser's or Bloustein's analysis of privacy, since it thought the result would
be the same in either event. Id. at 248 n.la. Significantly, while the court did not
specifically mention RBSTAT BENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652A (Tent. Draft No. 13,
1967), the factual pattern involved bore a striking resemblance to Prosser's tort of in-
trusion. The court's reference to cases involving intentional infliction of emotional
distress, 449 F.2d at 248, on the other hand, suggests an equal recognition of both
Prosser's categorization and Bloustein's expansive theory of invasion of privacy in
California. See note 2 supra.
21. 449 F.2d at 247.
22. Id.
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should have decided the question of the defendant's "liability for the
acts of its employees, as agents of the police," since Time had relied on
the Fourth Amendment in its pleadings and had argued it in the lower
court.2"
The doctrine of a legal right to privacy was generated by an 1890
law review article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, 24 where
they defined the right as the individual's "right of determining, ordi-
narily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others. '2. The authors discussed two fundamental
reasons denoting a need for the common law to develop a cause of
action for an invasion of privacy. One was the increased complexity
of modem civilization which made man more sensitive to publicity and
increased his need for privacy.20  The other was the great improvement
in the means of communications which subjected man's private life to
public view by those who were pandering to commercialism and to idle
and prurient curiosity.27  Warren and Brandeis felt the existing tort
law should provide a remedy to protect an individual's privacy from
invasions either "by the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the
possessor of any other modem device for recording or reproducing
scenes or sounds.
'28
23. Id. at 250.
24. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890) [herein-
after cited as Warren & Brandeis]. For a discussion of the article see Beaney, The
Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 253 (1966). See
also Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. Rnv. 713,
714-15 (1948).
25. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 198 (footnote omitted).
26. Id. at 196. Professor Fried discusses the need for privacy in terms of control:
The concept of privacy requires . . . a sense of control and a justified, acknowl-
edged power to control aspects of one's environment. But in most developed soci-
eties the only way to give a person the full measure of both the sense and the fact of
control is to give him a legal title to control. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,
493 (1968).
See also Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 34, 35-36 (1967), who de-
fined privacy as "the condition of human life in which acquaintance with a person or
with affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited;" and R. CLARK, CRIME iN
AMEmRCA 287 (1970), where it is said:
Privacy is the basis of individuality ...
Invasions of privacy demean the individual. Can a society be better than the
people composing it?
27. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 196.
28. Id. at 206. They also referred to the English case of Pollard v. Photographic Co.,
40 Ch. D. 345 (1888), where the plaintiff was granted recovery on a breach of con-
tract and breach of faith theory against a cameraman who was hired to take plaintiff's
picture, but then exhibited and sold copies of it. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24,
at 208. Warren and Brandeis were suggesting that the courts had recognized the right
of privacy previously, but had been protecting it on the basis of property and con-
tractual rights, and under relationships based on confidence. Id. at 206-08.
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The advances in technology, especially in the field of electronics,
have multiplied explosively since 1890, making possible more drastic
interferences with privacy.29 The enormity of the abuse that can re-
sult from the "frightening paraphernalia which the vaunted mar-
vels of an electronic age may visit upon human society" 30 is a factor
to weigh in considering the present and future development of the
right of privacy. In his dissenting opinion in Lopez v. United States,"1
Justice Brennan suggested that "electronic surveillance destroys all
anonymity and all privacy. ' 32 Even Life had expressed alarm about
the growing problem of electronic surveillance. In 1966, Life printed
an article entitled "Snooping Electronic Invasion of Privacy," which
stated:
Despite the protection against invasion of privacy afforded by the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, bugging is so shockingly wide-
spread and so increasingly insidious that no one can be certain any
longer that his home is his castle-free of intrusion.
Federal agencies and police operatives at least can argue that wire-
tapping and bugging are helpful aids in the enforcement of the law.
But that justification does not exist for the growing legions of private
citizens . . . who find it ridiculously easy to indulge in electronic spy-
ing.33
29. See Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier
and the Computer, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 837 (1971); Comment, Political Surveillance and
Police Intelligence Gathering-Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 175.
See also United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
990 (1969) (defendants convicted on the basis of police recordings of speeches made
in an auditorium). Justice Douglas has stated that "[tihe right of privacy, greatly
cherished in the American tradition, is fast disappearing." Douglas, The Attack on
the Right to Privacy, PLAYBOY, Dec. 1967, at 189.
30. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961).
31. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
32. Id. at 471; see S. DASH, R. SCHwARTz & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS
(1959). See also M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS (1964); V. PACKARD, THE
NAKED SOCIETY (1964); 116 CONG. Ic. 30797 (1970) (remarks of Senator Ervin);
116 CONG. REc. 39854 (1970) (remarks of Congressman Gallagher). And see
Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 1184, 1189
(1965), where it is stated:
The essence of privacy is no more, and certainly no less, than the freedom of the
individual to pick and choose for himself the time and circumstances under which,
and most importantly, the extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior and
opinions are to be shared with or withheld from others.
33. LIrFE, May 20, 1966, at 38 (emphasis added). And see TIME, July 15, 1966, at
38, where in an essay entitled "In Defense of Privacy," it was stated:
The privacy of a citizen's home and thoughts is the greatest distinction of a
democracy from a totalitarian state ...
.. . Today, just when the affluent society should be on the verge of providing
1973]
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The right of action for invasion of privacy, which has been recog-
nized in many jurisdictions,34 first appeared in California in Melvin v.
Reid."e The California court of appeal in Reid declared that the right
every American with as much or as little privacy as he chooses, there is more
justified alarm over the state of privacy than at any time in U.S. history.
The threat is twofold. One area involves deliberate efforts to get information
about the individual, often by technical means that have become starkly efficient.
The problem raised is legal and moral: When is such snooping justified in the in-
terests of society and how should it be controlled?
34. At least 36 states have recognized the right to privacy. PROSSER, supra note 2,
at 803-04. The tort did not exist at early common law. See Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 443 (1902). But cf. DeMay v. Roberts,
46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146, 149 (1881). The first case in the United States where
the highest court of a state gave judicial protection to privacy as a separate right was
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (a case involving
the appropriation and use of plaintiff's likeness). The Supreme Court of Georiga stated
that the "right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts of nature." Id. at 194,
50 S.E. at 69. An excellent discussion of the effect the flexibility of the common law
has had on privacy development is contained in Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View
Estates, 50 Haw. 374, 441 P.2d 141 (1968). There defendant's employees had photo-
graphed plaintiff next to the new house he purchased, and used the photographs, along
with plaintiff's name, in sales brochures, advertisements and television commercials. The
court stated that "[tihe common law system would have withered centuries ago had it
lacked the ability to expand and adapt to the social, economic, and political changes
inherent in a vibrant human society. 'mhe genius of the common law, upon which
our jurisprudence is based, is its capacity for orderly growth.'" Id. at 376, 441 P.2d
at 143, quoting Lum v. Fullaway, 42 Haw. 500, 502 (1958). Also see Kalven, Privacy
in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 326
(1966), where it was stated:
It takes a special form of foolhardiness to raise one's voice against the right of
privacy at this particular moment in its history. . . . Its development is a bit of
legal culture we are all likely to be proud of: it shows that the "eternal youth" of
the common law is still green; it is a reflection of civilized sensitivity to subtle
harms. . . . Id. at 327 (footnote omitted).
Kalven was referring to Warren and Brandeis' article when he used the words "eternal
youth." Id. n.9. They had said:
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a
principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to
time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political,
social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common
law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society . . . and now
the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,-the right to be let
alone. - . . Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 193 (emphasis added).
35. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). In this case, usually referred to as the
"Red Kimono" case, a motion picture was made depicting the life of a woman who had
been a prostitute and who had been tried for murder and acquitted some years earlier.
Id. at 286-87, 297 P. at 91. The court held that the use of incidents from her life was
not actionable because those incidents appeared in public records, but that the use of
her name in advertising the movie was an invasion of her right of privacy. Id. at
290-91, 297 P. at 93. It seems probable that if the case were brought today, the
court would also allow recovery for public disclosure of private facts. See text ac-
companying note 45 infra.
A later case which denied recovery for invasion of privacy was Metter v. Los
Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939), where a husband sued
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to privacy was implicitly encompassed in article I, section 1 of the
California Constitution, which provided:
All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain and inal-
ienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pur-
suing and obtaining safety and happiness.3 6
The court interpreted this section as permitting recognition of "the
right to pursue and obtain safety and happiness without improper in-
fringements thereon by others. 37  In Gill v. Curtis Publishing Com-
pany,38 the California Supreme Court affirmed a cause of action for pri-
a newspaper for publishing a picture of his wife who had committed suicide in public.
The husband contended that the picture had been stolen from his home. Although
the court ruled against him, holding his wife had waived her privacy by committing
suicide in public, it would seem that had the husband been able to prove theft by the
defendant of the picture from the home, there would have been an invasion of privacy
by intrusion.
In Mau v. Rio Grade Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939), it was held that
plaintiff stated a cause of action where he alleged that defendant broadcast an adver-
tising program, dramatizing a holdup and shooting in which he had been a victim, a
year after the incident and used plaintiff's name without his consent.
36. 112 Cal. App. at 291, 297 P. at 93, quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1849).
37. 112 Cal. App. at 291, 297 P. at 93. Implication of a right of privacy is no
longer necessary since the section was recently amended by an initiative ballot measure
in the November 7, 1972, California General Election, elevating the right to express con-
stitutional status. The last phrase of the constitutional provision now reads "and pursu-
ing and obtaining safety and happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis
added).
38. 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952). Plaintiffs were held to have stated a
cause of action by alleging they were sitting on stools in their ice cream parlor in a
public market and that defendants, without consent, took their picture in a romantic
pose and published it in a magazine with an article disparaging love founded on sex-
ual attraction alone. But see Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d
441 (1953), where the same court denied recovery to the same plaintiffs for invasion
of privacy by another defendant on the basis of the same picture, stressing that the
picture had not been "surreptitiously snapped on private grounds, but rather was
taken of plaintiffs in a pose voluntarily assumed in a public market place." Id. at 230,
253 P.2d at 444. In dealing with cases where the only invasion claimed was the pub-
lication of allegedly private facts, as in the second Gill case, the courts have often
distinguished between activities occurring in open public view and those occurring
within public enclosures. But in Daily-Times-Democrat Co. v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380,
162 So. 2d 474 (1964), where the plaintiff was photographed in a "fun house" with
her dress blown up over her head, and in Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199,
159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), where plaintiff was photographed without her consent in a
hospital bed, both courts held there was an invasion of privacy. See also Nader v.
General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 567, 255 N.E.2d 765, 769, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647,
653 (1970), where the New York Court of Appeals (applying District of Columbia
law) noted there can be no invasion of privacy "where the information sought is
open to public view or has been voluntarily revealed to others." However, the
court went on to note a person does not automatically make public everything he does
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vacy, expressly adopting the Reid court's definition of privacy as "'the
right to live one's life in seclusion, without being subjected to unwar-
ranted and undesired publicity. .. [i]n short. . . the right to be let
alone.'-"9 Further indications were given in Britt v. Superior Court4"
that intrusion upon the seclusion of an individual would be considered as
constituting an invasion of privacy. The court held that the use of a
peephole in a man's restroom by the police to observe events occurring
in a toilet stall was an illegal search within the Fourth Amendment and
also constituted an unreasonable invasion of Britt's privacy, noting that:
[A]uthority to maintain clandestine surveillance of common use pub-
lie places and persons therein is not the equivalent of license to sur-
reptitiously invade the right of personal privacy of persons in private
places. Man's constitutionally protected right of personal privacy not
only abides with him while he is the householder within his own castle
but cloaks him when as a member of the public he is temporarily oc-
cupying a room-including a toilet stall-to the extent that it is offered
to the public for private, however transient, individual use.4 '
Other cases by the California Supreme Court have demonstrated the
growing interest in protecting the individual's right to privacy. In
Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young,42 the court invalidated the provisions
of a disclosure statute which directed every public officer and each
candidate to file as a public record a statement describing the nature of
his investments and those of his immediate family. The court held
that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad in that it intruded both
into relevant and irrelevant private financial affairs. Justice Burke, in
writing the opinion for the court, stated:
[W]e are satisfied that the protection of one's personal financial af-
fairs. . . against compulsory public disclosure is an aspect of the zone
of privacy which is protected by the Fourth Amendment and which also
by being in a public place. Id. at 570, 255 N.E.2d at 771, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
And see text accompanying notes 63-66 infra.
39. 38 ACal. 2d at 276, 239 P.2d at 632, quoting Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App.
285, 289, 297 P. 91, 92 (1931). Mr. Justice Douglas counts the right to travel, re-
ligious freedom, and indeed all rights of conscience among the various protected in-
terests included in the right of privacy or the right to be let alone. W. DOUGLAS,
THE RiGHT OF THE PEOPLE 87-88 (1958). The United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged existence of a general right to privacy. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
40. 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962).
41. Id. at 472, 374 P.2d at 819, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 851; see 63 COLUM. L. Rnv.
955 (1963). A recent case has held, however, that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy if the defendant's activities could have been viewed from the public portion
of the restroom. People v. Triggs, 26 Cal. App. 3d 381, 102 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1972).
42. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
[Vol. 6
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falls within that penumbra of constitutional rights into which the govern-
ment may not intrude absent a showing of compelling need and that the
intrusion is not overly broad.
43
Most recently, in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association,44 the court
upheld a complaint alleging that the publication of the past crime of a re-
habilitated felon in connection with his name amounted to an unprivi-
leged invasion of privacy." While the publication of the past crime
was constitutionally protected, the California Supreme Court held that
the use of plaintiff's name was not. Although Briscoe did not involve
electronic surveillance, the court clearly enunciated the relationship be-
tween the right to privacy and the use of electronic devices:
Acceptance of the right to privacy has grown with the increasing capa-
bility of the mass media and electronic devices with their capacity to de-
stroy an individual's anonymity, intrude upon his most intimate activi-
ties, and expose his most personal characteristics to public gaze.46
43. Id. at 268, 466 P.2d at 231-32, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8.
44. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
45. The court held that Briscoe had stated a cause of action, valid against a
general demurrer, where, under the facts alleged, a jury could reasonably find that
publication of his identity was of minimal social value, that revelation of past criminal
record would be grossly offensive to most people, that he had not voluntarily consented
to the publicity accorded him in the article, and that a continuing threat that his old
identity would be resurrected by the publishing media would be counter-productive to
the goals of the correctional process because he had become rehabilitated. But see
Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969), where the
court found no cause of action for invasion of privacy to exist where a newspaper
publisher printed an editorial comment of repeated misconduct of plaintiffs minor
children. The court held the editorial was published in the context of the plaintiff's
candidacy for public office, which rendered the past behavior of the children signifi-
cant and newsworthy, thus falling within the New York Times doctrine. See note 69
infra. For a more complete discussion of the Briscoe case see Note, 60 CALIF. L. REv.
1042 (1972); Note, Rehabilitation, Privacy and Freedom of the Press--Striking a New
Balance: Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, 5 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 544 (1972); Com-
ment, Torts-Right of Privacy-Effect of Lapse of Time on the Constitutional Privilege,
24 S. CAR. L. REV. 123 (1972).
46. 4 Cal. 3d at 533, 483 P.2d at 37, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 869. The court observed:
Men fear exposure not only to those closest to them; much of the outrage under-
lying the asserted right to privacy is a reaction to exposure to persons known
only through business or other secondary relationships. The claim is not so much
one of total secrecy as it is of the right to define one's circle of intimacy-to
choose who shall see beneath the quotidian mask. Loss of control over which
"face" one puts on may result in literal loss of self-identity... and is humiliating
beneath the gaze of those whose curiosity treats a human being as an object. Id.
at 534, 483 P.2d at 37, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 869, citing Westin, Science, Privacy, and
Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 1003, 1023
(1966).
And see Negley, Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy, 31 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 319, 320 (1966) where it was stated:
The nature of our social structure as it has developed in the recent past forces us
to recognize that the privacy which until now has apparently been casually pre-
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California courts have also handed down a series of decisions im-
posing liability on defendants who have damaged interests analogous to
those asserted by Dietemann, based upon the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.17  The California Supreme Court, in Alcorn v.
Anbro Engineering,48 allowed recovery to a black American when a
foreman intentionally disparaged plaintiff's race in a rude, violent, in-
solent manner and fired him, causing emotional and physical distress.
The most recent case, decided just a month after Dietemann, is Golden
v. Dungan,4 9 wherein a husband and wife sued in separate actions for
abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging
that defendants maliciously and with intent to inflict extreme mental
suffering caused process to be served at plaintiffs' home at midnight
in a loud and boisterous manner and that plaintiffs experienced severe
emotional suffering as a proximate result of such intentional conduct.
The court of appeal held that each complaint stated a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Although the Dietemann
court recognized that cases in the emotional distress area are not di-
rect authority in the privacy field, it relied on them as indicative of the
trend in California law expanding the zone of interests the courts will
protect. 50
sumed as an ingredient of moral action can no longer be presumed but must be
specified.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965) defines the tort as follows:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
48. 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
49. 20 Cal. App. 3d 295, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1971). See also State Rubbish Col-
lectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1954); Fletcher v. Western
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970). See generally
1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 9.1-.7, at 665-91 (1956); PROSSER,
supra note 2, § 12, at 49-62; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the
Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. Rv. 1033 (1936); Smith, Problems of Proof in Psychic
Injury Cases, 14 SYRAcusE L. REv. 586 (1963); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100 (1959).
50. 449 F.2d at 248-49. The District Court of New York has recently held that a
cause of action was stated for both invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of
emotional distress where a school employee divulged information given to the school in
confidence by a pupil. Blair v. Union Free School Dist., 67 Misc. 2d 248, 324 N.Y.S.2d
222 (Dist. Ct. 1971). But see Wynne v. Orcutt Union School Dist., 17 Cal. App. 3d
1108, 95 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1971), where the California court of appeal held that the
plaintiffs did not state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiffs had sued for damages for shock to their nervous systems as a result of their
son's teacher's disclosure to the son's classmates that the son had a progressively dis-
abling and ultimately fatal disease. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912,
69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), where the California Supreme Court expanded the zone of
interest for negligent infliction of emotional distress and allowed a mother to recover
for shock when she saw her child hit by a car.
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Intrusion upon solitude has been recognized as a distinct form of
invasion of privacy in many jurisdictions other than California. 5 It
has been held that unauthorized bugging of a dwelling,52 tapping or
otherwise listening on a telephone53 or an extension phone,54 snooping
with binoculars or through windows,55 and overzealous shadowing 5
amount to invasions of privacy by intrusion. 57  In Nader v. General
Motors Corporation,"8 the New York Court of Appeals held that under
District of Columbia law the defendant intruded upon Nader's right of
privacy by tapping his telephone and shadowing him. The numerous
cases prior to Nader which allowed recovery for invasion of privacy by
intrusion have been summarized in section 652B of Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which provides:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the soli-
tude or seclusion of another, or his private affairs or concerns, is sub-
ject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable man.59
51. This branch of the law of privacy is covered quite completely in Ezer, Intrusion
On Solitude: Herein of Civil Rights and Civil Wrongs, 21 LAw IN TRANSITION 63
(1961). See also Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1296 (1967).
52. Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Roach v. Harper,
143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).
53. Fowler v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965);
LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533 (1963).
54. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810
(1939); Commonwealth v. Murray, 423 Pa. 37, 223 A.2d 102 (1966).
55. Alabama Electric Co-Op., Inc. v. Partridge, 284 Ala. 442, 225 So. 2d 848 (1969);
Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 1956).
56. Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159, 132
S.E.2d 119 (1963).
57. Invasion of the right to privacy has been defined, in part, by the Ohio Su-
preme Court as "the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities." Kane v. Quigley,
I Ohio St. 2d 1, 4, 203 N.E.2d 338, 340 (1964). Justice Brennan has suggested the
individual's interest in privacy to be "preventing unwarranted intrusion upon the pri-
vate aspects of his life." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1970).
The same principles have been applied to other forms of intrusion upon seclusion or
into private affairs. Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936) (unreason-
able prying into private bank account); Rugg v. McCarty, 476 P.2d 753 (Colo.
1970) (creditor harassing debtor); Carey v. Statewide Finance Co., 3 Conn. Cir. 716,
223 A.2d 405 (1966) (creditor hounding debtor with calls); Welsh v. Roehm, 125
Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (landlord moving into same house with tenant);
Frey v. Dixon, 141 N.J Eq. 481, 58 A.2d 86 (1948) (subpoena duces tecum requiring
production of books and documents); Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110
S.E.2d 716 (1959) (search of woman's shopping bag in store); cf. Bednarik v. Bednarik,
18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80 (Ch. 1940) (illegal compulsory blood test used to deter-
mine parentage), overruled by Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717,
721 (1950). See Note, 57 GEo. L.. 509 (1969); Note, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1342 (1964).
58. 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, at 103 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
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Against this background, and although no similar decision by a Cal-
ifornia court existed, the court of appeals concluded that the photograph-
ing of Dietemann and recording of his conversation, without his con-
sent, in his den (an area in which he was entitled to privacy),00 as a
result of which he suffered injury to his feelings and peace of mind,
were actionable intrusions upon Dietemann's seclusion and solitude. 1
Apparently ignoring the Restatement's proposed offensiveness stand-
ard, -62 the court adopted the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test
as first stated in Katz v. United States.8 Mr. Justice Stewart, writ-
ing for the majority of eight justices in Katz, declared that the inter-
ceptions of Katz' telephone conversations from a phone booth repre-
sented an unreasonable search and seizure of those conversations in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 4 The term "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy" first appeared in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
in Katz, where he stated:
60. 449 F.2d at 249. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 808-09.
61. 449 F.2d at 248-49. Warren and Brandeis felt that invasion of man's privacy
by modem enterprise and invention had "subjected him to mental pain and distress,
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury." Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 24, at 196. They went on to say that "[ilf the invasion of privacy constitutes a
legal injuria, the elements for demanding redress exist, since already the value of mental
suffering, caused by an act wrongful in itself, is recognized as a basis for compensa-
tion." Id. at 213. See also Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal.
App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955).
62. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652B, comment d at 105 (Tent. Draft
No. 13, 1967). The Restatement's offensiveness standard, which is discussed at length
in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866
(1971), has been criticized as being unworkable and possibly unconstitutional. Note,
Rehabilitation, Privacy and Freedom of the Press-Striking a New Balance: Briscoe v.
Reader's Digest Association, 5 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 544 (1972).
63. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Dietemann court, quoting from Pearson v. Dodd,
410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969), said it was con-
vinced California would "'approve the extension of the tort of invasion of privacy to
instances of intrusion, whether by physical trespass or not, into spheres from which an
ordinary man in plaintiffs position could reasonably expect that the particular defend-
ant should be excluded."' 449 F.2d at 249.
In People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 366-67, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62,
68 (1971), the Supreme Court of California affirmed a judgment of dismissal and an
order suppressing evidence which police had obtained in a search of defendants'
trash. The court stated that, under the circumstances of the case, defendants "had a
reasonable expectation that their trash would not be rummaged through and picked
over by police officers acting without a search warrant." Certiorari was granted by
the United States Supreme Court, which remanded the case for further proceedings
since it could not be ascertained whether the decision had been based on federal or
California constitutional grounds. California v. Krivda, 406 U.S. 904 (1972) con-
sidered on remand sub nom. People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623 (1973). See also
State v. Stanton, 490 P.2d 1274 (Or. App. 1971).
64. 389 U.S. at 353.
NOTES
[A]n enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, and un-
like a field, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.0 5
Justice Harlan proceeded to develop a twofold requirement for the
reasonable expectation of privacy test:
[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as "reasonable." 66
Using a man's home as an example, Justice Harlan then applied the test:
Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the
"plain view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to
keep them to himself has been exhibited. 67
The Dietemann court, expressing agreement with other jurisdictions,
held that an invasion of privacy based on an intrusion is established
without the necessity of proving publication, the existence of a technical
trespass, or special damages,6 thereby making Time liable merely upon
proof of the intrusion.
Time sought to justify the intrusion of its agents by characterizing their
actions as investigatorial reporting privileged under the First Amend-
ment's protection of the rights of free speech and freedom of the press.69
It relied upon New York Times Co. v. Sullivan70 to sustain its con-
65. Id. at 360 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 361.
67. Id.
68. 449 F.2d at 247.
69. Id. at 249.
70. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Summarized, the New York Times doctrine is that,
absent a showing of actual malice, a public official cannot recover fori defama-
tory falsehoods relating to his official conduct. The United States Supreme Court in
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (involving false light in the public eye), ex-
tended the New York Times doctrine in defamation to cover actions for invasions of
privacy where publication is involved. The Court stated:
[Tlhe constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the application of
the New York statute to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the
absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its
falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. Id. at 387-88.
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), the Supreme Court held
that a constitutional privilege applied to a radio station's report of the arrest of a pri-
vate individual for possession of obscene material. The radio report had characterized
Rosenbloom as a "girlie book peddler" and his business as a "smut literature racket."
Justice Brennan, in the opinion of the Court, further extended the doctrine to include
public events:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become
less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense
the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's
primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the par-
ticipant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct. . . . Id. at 43.
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tention that the First Amendment created a privilege which in-
sulated it from liability for any crimes or torts committed in the proc-
ess of newsgathering. However, the court disagreed. 71  It has been
said that "[tihe right to speak and publish does not carry with it the
unrestrained right to gather information. 72  As the California Su-
See Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming Newsworthiness
Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 371 (1970), where it is stated:
The New York Times privilege has since been extended to defamatory false
statements concerning the public conduct of "public figures" and to non-defama-
tory false statements about persons who are not public figures but who are invol-
untarily in the public eye. Id. (footnotes omitted).
See also Keeton, Some Implications of the Constitutional Privilege to Defame, 25
VAND. L REv. 59 (1972); Note, Public Official and Actual Malice Standards: The
Evolution of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 56 IowA L. REV. 393, 398-400 (1970).
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652F, at 127 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967),
provides as follows:
1) One is privileged to give publicity to facts concerning another which would
otherwise constitute an invasion of his privacy, to the extent that such pub-
licity is given to (news or other) matters in which the public has a legitimate
interest.
2) The privilege stated in subsection (1) extends to false statements of such
facts, unless they are made with knowledge of their falsity, or in reckless
disregard of whether they are true.
The Restatement refers to those forms of invasion of privacy where publication is an
essential element of the tort. These include, according to Prosser's categorization,
false light in the public eye and public disclosure of private facts. See note 2 supra.
The public interest concept was mentioned by Warren and Brandeis when they stated
that "it1he right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of
public or general interest." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 214.
71. 449 F.2d at 249.
72. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652F, comment k at 134 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967), suggests that the First Amend-
ment privilege "does not protect a defendant from liability for intrusion." The
Dietemann court pointed out:
Privilege concepts developed in defamation cases and to some extent in privacy
actions in which publication is an essential component are not relevant in determin-
ing liability for intrusive conduct anteceding publication. 449 F.2d at 249-50, citing
Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Ap-
plied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935, 957 (1968).
RE TATEmNT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652F, comment b at 127-28 (Tent. Draft No. 13,
1967) states:
[Tlhe right of privacy . . . is not complete and unlimited but is subject to the
privilege of the press, or of other disseminators of information, to publish matters
in which the public has a legitimate interest. At the same time this privilege is in
itself not complete and unlimited, and extends only to such matters as do not
unduly invade the interest in privacy. Each is a limi.ation upon the other.
Justice Brennan, writing in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47-48
(1971), stated:
We have recognized that "re]xposure of the self to others in varying degrees is
a concomitant of life in a civilized community." Time, Inc. v. Hill, [385 U.S.] at
388. Voluntarily or not, we are all "public" men to some degree. Conversely,
some aspects of the lives of even the most public men fall outside the area of
matters of public or general concern.
And, in a prior footnote, Justice Brennan pointed out that the Court was "not to be
understood as implying that no area of a person's activities falls outside the area
NOTES
preme Court noted in Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co.:73
The right of privacy does undoubtedly infringe upon absolute freedom
of speech and of the press, and it also clashes with the interest of the
public in having a free dissemination of news and information. These
paramount public interests must be taken into account in placing the
necessary limitations upon the right of privacy. But if this right of the
individual is not without qualifications, neither is freedom of speech
and of the press unlimited. The latter privilege is subject to the
qualification that it shall not be so exercised as to abuse the rights of
individuals.
74
Therefore, the individual's right to privacy and the greater evils re-
sulting from invasion of privacy outweigh the asserted right of unlim-
ited investigatorial powers of the press. The court of appeals in
Dietemann felt that although newsgathering was essential to the dis-
semination of news and protected by the First Amendment, electronic
surveillance was not indispensable to such newsgathering,75 and said:
We agree that newsgathering is an integral part of news dissemination.
We strongly disagree, however, that the hidden mechanical contrivances
are "indispensable tools" of newsgathering. . . . The First Amend-
ment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic
means into the precincts of another's home or office.76
The line of cases relied on by Time, commencing with New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan77 and extending to Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,78 were also clearly distinguishable from Dietemann since they in-
of public or general interest." 403 U.S. at 44 n.12.
Recently, a district court, in Buckley v. Esquire, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 1133, 1134
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), refused to extend the New York Times doctrine, stating: "mo extend
the Times doctrine to include every aspect of a person's private life is an unfounded
extension of the constitutional doctrine."
One author has argued that the right of privacy is an endangered tort which might be
swallowed up by the First Amendment privileges accorded the mass media. See
Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 326 (1966); Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment:
Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. Cr. REv. 267. Even in 1890, Warren and Brandeis
noted that "[tihe press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propri-
ety and of decency." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 196. See also Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 245, 255.
73. 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).
74. Id. at 277, 239 P.2d at 633.
75. 449 F.2d at 249.
76. Id. (footnote omitted).
77. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
78. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See also Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295
(1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Garrison v.
1973]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
volved torts directly related to the sensitive area of publication-
either defamation or the invasions of privacy which include publication
as an essential element.79  The Dietemann court was not concerned with
the publication of the article in Life magazine, but rather focused its
attention on the newsgathering methods used by Life to obtain the
information for the story subsequently published.8 0  The tort was com-
pleted with the obtaining of the information by intrusive means-
surreptitious photography and recording. The cause of action for
invasion of privacy by intrusion exists even if there is no publication of
the information obtained. Publication and the concomitant privilege
of a free press have no relevance to a tortious intrusion.8' The rationale
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281
(1908) (where the court denied recovery for defamation without a showing of malice).
79. For a discussion of the distinction between defamation and privacy, see Bern-
stein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817, 824 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd,
232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956). See also Wade, Defama-
tion and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (1962); Wright,
Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know: A National Problem and a
New Approach, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 630, 634 (1968), the latter noting:
What we must weigh is society's interest in preserving each individual's right to
privacy and freedom from defamation against society's interest in affording each
individual full disclosure and commentary.
The two torts--defamation and privacy-protect different interests. "The right of
privacy concerns one's own peace of mind, while the right of freedom from defamation
concerns primarily one's reputation." Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co.,
138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 86, 291 P.2d 194, 197 (1955); accord, Themo v. New England
Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753 (1940).
80. 449 F.2d at 249-50. The district court had rested its decision on the publica-
tion, pointing out:
Although Prosser in his article appears to say that intrusion without publicity
may constitute an invasion of privacy, the California courts seem to require pub-
lication. 284 F. Supp. at 929 (citations omitted).
81. In Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947
(1969), the court stated:
Unlike other types of invasion of privacy, intrusion does not involve as one of its
essential elements the publication of the information obtained. The tort is com-
pleted with the obtaining of the information by improperly intrusive means.
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals in Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25
N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970) pointed out that privacy was
one's right to keep knowledge about oneself from exposure to others, the right to
prevent "the obtaining of the information by improperly intrusive means."
In order to sustain a cause of action for invasion of privacy, therefore, the plain-
tiff must show that the appellant's conduct was truly "intrusive" and that it was
designed to elicit information which would not be available through normal in-
quiry or observation. Id. at 567, 255 N.E.2d at 769, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 652-53,
quoting Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
In McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 102, 2 S.E.2d 810,
817 (1939), the court observed: "Publication or commercialization may aggravate, but
the individual's right to privacy is invaded and violated nevertheless in the original act
of intrusion."
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for the constitutional privilege of the press seems to be the legiti-
mate public interest in publication of newsworthy material. This ra-
tionale does not, however, stretch so far as to condone intentional or
reckless invasions of privacy by the press.8 2  Time admitted "that the
intrusion [in Dietemann] was conducted primarily for its benefit."83
Such deliberate intrusions for newsgathering purposes are in flagrant
disregard of an individual's right to privacy.
The court of appeals did not reach the issue of whether the acts of
Life's employees violated the United States Constitution, thereby sub-
jecting it to liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983.4 Further, on appeal
Time disclaimed any contention that its employees were acting under
the authority of the police. s5 The court accepted the disclaimer and
by doing so avoided considering "the impact of the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments on the relationship between the exclusionary rules
in criminal cases and substantive law in a private tort action."8  The
district court had held that the activities of Life's employees, acting as
agents of law enforcement officials, did not constitute a reasonable
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652B, note at 103 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967)
points out that "[invasion of privacy by intrusion] is very definitely a distinct form of
the tort which does not depend upon publicity."
82. Privileges or exemptions should not be facilely extended judicially except out
of the necessities of the strongest public policy or by reason of constitutional
mandates. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 216, 220, 260 N.Y.S.2d
451, 455, motion to dismiss appeal denied, 16 N.Y.2d 1082, 213 N.E.2d 696, 266
N.Y.S.2d 405 (1965).
Even Warren and Brandeis in their article made statements that lead one to conclude
that the malice or reckless disregard criteria set forth in New York Times should not
afford a defense to invasion of privacy:
The invasion of privacy that is to be protected is equally complete and equally
injurious, whether the motives by which the speaker or writer was actuated are,
taken by themselves, culpable or not. . . . Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24,
at 218.
83. 449 F.2d at 252 (Carter, J., concurring and dissenting) (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 247. See note 16 supra.
"[Ilf a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitu-
tional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the
Court will decide only the latter." Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297
U.S. 288, 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring), citing Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909).
85. 449 F.2d at 247.
86. Id. at 249 n.3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), incorporated the scope of
the Fourth Amendment within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and held that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the United
States Constitution is inadmissible in a state criminal trial. Justice Clark, writing for
the Court, went on to say that the Fourth Amendment protects "[tlhe right of pri-
vacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the
people." Id. at 656. Dietemann did not assert the Fourth Amendment in the criminal
proceedings against him. 284 F. Supp. at 931.
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search or seizure within the confines mandated by the Fourth Amend-
ment.8
7
Although many courts have considered a man's home to be his
castle,88 society permits police to enter under well-defined circum-
stances with a warrant,89 or without a warrant where there is probable
cause to believe a felony is being committed. 90 The United States
Supreme Court has considered cases with factual patterns similar to
Dietemann where it was argued that the police conduct violated the
Fourth Amendment. In Hoffa v. United States9 the Court held that
the defendant's misplaced trust, even though obtained by deceit, could
not constitutionally invalidate information received through the process
of implanting an electronic receiver on an informer.9 2  The Hoffa case
arose out of efforts to tamper with a jury during Hoffa's trial on charges
related to misuse of union funds. Edward Partin, the chief government
witness and the only one linking Hoffa to the attempted bribes, volun-
teered as a close personal friend of Hoffa to inform the authorities of
any illegal activities at the forthcoming trial. The Court dismissed
Hoffa's claim that Partin's evidence had been obtained in violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights. Justice Stewart, writing for the ma-
87. 284 F. Supp. at 931.
88. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961):
At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.
And in United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951), a! 'd, 343 U.S.
747 (1952), the court said:
A sane, decent, civilized society must provide . . . some shelter from public
scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a
man's castle.
89. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), where it was ob-
served:
Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern
to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The
right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not
only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable se-
curity and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reason-
ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer,
not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932), where it was
said:
The Fourth Amendment forbids every search that is unreasonable and is con-
strued liberally to safeguard the right of privacy.
For a discussion of the necessity of probable cause for issuance of a warrant, see Com-
ment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment,
28 U. Cm. L. REv. 664, 687-88 (1961).
The common law has always recognized a man's house as his castle. . . . Shall the
courts thus close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the
back door to idle or prurient curiosity? Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 220.
91. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
92. Id. at 302-03.
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jority, stated that because Partin "was in the suite by invitation, and
every conversation which he heard was either directed to him or
knowingly carried on in his presence," Hoffa was obviously "relying upon
his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his wrongdoing." 93
More recently, in United States v. White,94 the Court held that the
absence of a search warrant or court authorization95 did not invalidate
electronic surveillance by federal agents of conversations between the
defendant and an informer on whom a transmitter had been placed
because the defendant had consented to the informer's presence, and the
informer had agreed to the eavesdropping.96
The Dietemann court of appeals recognized that "[o]ne who invites
another to his home or office takes a risk that the visitor. . . may repeat
all he hears and observes when he leaves. ' 97  But, explicitly refusing
to consider any Fourth Amendment implications, the court concluded:
[H]e does not and should not be required to take the risk that what is
heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or recording, or in
our modern world, in full living color and hi-fi to the public at large or
to any segment of it the visitor may select. 98
93. Id. at 302; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); Lewis v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39
(1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952). See also Comment, The
Supreme Court: 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REV. 112, 125, 186, 192 (1967); Note, Judicial
Control of Secret Agents, 76 YALE L.J. 994, 1009-14 (1967).
94. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
95. Wiretapping and other interceptions of wire or oral communications are regu-
lated by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1968), which sections contain provisions for authori-
zation of such interceptions in proper cases. See Comment, The Fourth Amendment,
Electronic Eavesdropping and the Invasion of Privacy, 17 S. DAK. L. REv. 238, 248
(1972), where it is suggested that "[tihe evils of permitting non-judicially approved
electronic surveillance strike at the very foundations of our democracy." Mr. Justice
Stewart, in Katz, stated that electronic surveillance by police, under strict protective
limitations, is constitutional:
[1It is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly
authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investigation, spe-
cifically informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly apprised
of the precise intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have authorized,
with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the Govern-
ment asserts in fact took place. 389 U.S. at 354.
And see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1967), where the Court delineated
the guidelines for court authorized electronic surveillance.
96. See Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping & Eavesdropping:
Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68
COLUM. L. Rnv. 189 (1968). See also Comment, The Fourth Amendment, Electronic
Eavesdropping and the Invasion of Privacy, 17 S. DAK. L. Rv. 238 (1972).
97. 449 F.2d at 249. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971).
The notion of assumption of the risk seems to have made its first appearance in the
dissent of Justice Brennan in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963).
98. 449 F.2d at 249.
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The court, applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test,
correctly concluded that Dietemann's home was a sphere from which he
could reasonably expect to exclude eavesdropping private citizens, news-
men or otherwise. 99 Dieteman did not open his home to the public, nor
did he invite Life's employees in their capacity as newsmen.' 00 But
it seems clear that had the Dietemann court reached the Fourth
Amendment agency question, it would not have agreed with the dis-
trict court. Rather, the court of appeals would have been compelled to
find that the activities of Life's employees were reasonable searches
and seizures which did not violate Dietemann's Fourth Amendment
rights. Justice Stewart, in the majority opinion in Katz, expressed it
well when he said:
Virtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy to
some degree. The question in each case is whether that interference vio-
lates a command of the United States Constitution.'
The right of privacy must yield under certain circumstances where there
is probable cause for a search or seizure. Reasonable police intrusion
is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment and is a risk inherent in our
society.
Judge Carter, in his separate opinion in Dietemann, also did not dis-
cuss whether there had actually been a violation of Dietemann's Fourth
Amendment rights. However, he did feel the effect of the Fourth
Amendment on the cause of action for invasion of privacy by intru-
sion should have been considered by the court since Time had
relied extensively on Fourth Amendment cases in its brief on appeal. 102
The real issue is whether liability may be imposed on state officials or
their agents for an invasion of privacy when the actions were consti-
tutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment as reasonable
searches and seizures. Even if the court had found no violation of
99. Id. For discussion of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, see notes
63-66 and accompanying text supra.
100. 284 F. Supp. at 929-30.
101. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967).
102. Judge Carter's opinion points out that, even if the court had decided that under
state tort law one could not be held liable for intrusion where the intrusion was reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment, the entrance and invasion of privacy was not
justified under the Fourth Amendment if there was no benefit to police officers and
if the sole intention of the hookup between the police and the defendant was to
immunize Time from liability. He pointed out emphatically that no benefit should
be recognized in this case, since the police had all the information they needed.
Here Time, through its publication Life, realizing it could not unilaterally invade
Dietemann's house and privacy, sought the protection of cooperation with state
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Dietemann's rights under the United States Constitution, Judge Carter
pointed out that states have the power to control and remedy a state
intrusion on a person's privacy by imposition of civil liability.1"' A
state has the power to restrict the activities of its law enforcement
officials and to provide protection for the right of privacy. As Judge
Carter noted, this fact was recognized in Katz, where the Supreme Court
stated that "'the protection of a person's general right to privacy-his
right to be let alone by other people-is, like the protection of his
property and his very life, left largely to the law of the individual
States.' "104 The states can restrict the power of their law enforcement
officers to a greater extent than the restrictions imposed by the Su-
preme Court. 05
An additional issue raised by Dietemann is the interplay of the
Fourth Amendment and the recent recognition of the right to privacy
as a federal constitutional right when governmental action is involved.
Although the United States Constitution does not refer to a general right
of privacy, it has been recognized as an adjunct to specific consti-
tutional provisions. 0 6 Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v.
officials. The officials, recognizing their duty not to publicly expose the results
of police investigations, accepted the services of Life. Each thereby achieved
jointly which [sic] neither could have achieved separately. 449 F.2d at 252.
103. 449 F.2d at 251. Judge Carter also discussed the conflicting interests in-
volved in a decision as to whether a state may allow such a cause of action. In
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), the rejection of the application of the federal exclusionary rule to state court
proceedings was supported by the existence of civil liability for any abuse of search and
seizure guarantees by state officials. See Comment, Wolf v. Colorado and Unreasonable
Search and Seizure in California, 38 CALF. L. REv. 498, 509 (1950).
104. 449 F.2d at 251, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
105. Chief Justice Warren Burger has long advocated eliminating the exclusionary
rule and replacing it with civil action against the individual law enforcement official. In
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), the Court fashioned a private cause of action for civil liability against federal
officials who violate the commands of the Fourth Amendment. On remand of Bivens, the
court of appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Medina, held that the F.B.I. agents had
no immunity to protect them from damage suits charging violations of constitutional
rights. 456 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (2d Cir. 1972). However, the court held that it is a
valid defense to such charges to allege and prove that the officials acted in good faith
and with a reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest and search. Id. at 1347-48;
ef. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd in part sub nom. District of
Columbia v. Carter, 93 S. Ct. 602 (1973). See also Jaffe, Suits Against Governments
and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. Rnv. 209 (1963); Note, The Constitution
as Positive Law: Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 5 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 126 (1972).
106. In the early case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), it was
noted that privacy was a sacred right:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional
liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then
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United States,1 1 7 stated as follows:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They conferred, as against the Gov-
ernment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.1
08
The Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut °" recognized a consti-
tutional right of marital privacy which a state could not invade by a
law prohibiting the use of contraceptives. Justice Douglas, in an opin-
ion announcing the decision of the Court, described the right of pri-
vacy as a variety of interests consisting of complex conceptualizations
whose facets are reflected in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. 110 He also observed that the "specific guar-
antees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from these guarantees that help give them life and substance.""' Noting
before the court. . . . [Tihey apply to all invasions on the part of the govern-
ment and its employds of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that consti-
tutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property. Id. at 630.
In Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905), the
first high court allowing recovery for invasion of the right of privacy based the
right on the constitutional guarantees of life, liberty, and happiness. See Bernstein v.
National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817, 830 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956), where the court discussed the right
of privacy as within the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty and security.
See also Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 (1960), where
the author felt the right of privacy to be an underlying theme of the Bill of Rights.
107. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
108. Id. at 478, quoted with approval in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring). See also Dykstra, The Right Most Valued by Civilized Man, 6 UTAH
L. R v. 305 (1959).
109. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
110. Id. at 484.
111. Id. "MIlhe First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion." Id. at 483; see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-22 (1960)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional
Charter For an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MicH. L. REv. 197, 205-06 (1965).
The First Amendment has been said to encompass notions of privacy. Gibson v.
Florida Legis. Invest. Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 570 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 107-08 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), the Court identified the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments as protecting "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life." See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Many commen-
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that they were dealing with "a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights," the Court held the law forbidding the use of contraceptives
unconstitutional. 112  As Justice Goldberg stated in his concurring opin-
ion, in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined, the right
of privacy "is a fundamental personal right, emanating 'from the to-
tality of the constitutional scheme under which we live.' "113 Justices
Harlan and White, in separate concurring opinions, applied the flexible
due process approach of the Fourteenth Amendment, also finding the
right of marital privacy to be a fundamental one.11 4  Therefore, de-
spite disagreement over the proper approach, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized some forms of privacy as fundamental constitutional rights." 5
The question remains whether a person may be subjected to an in-
trusion amounting to a search and seizure, reasonable under the
tators have urged a broad construction of the Fourth Amendment to protect privacy.
However, according to William Beaney, the right of privacy might be on more solid
ground if it were premised on privacy being a part of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Beaney, Constitutional
Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup. CT. Rnv. 212 (1963). And see Bergstrom, The Applica-
ability of the 'New' Fourth Amendment to Investigations by Secret Agents: A Proposed
Delineation of the Emerging Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 45 WASH. L. Rnv.
785 (1970).
Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold, concluded that the Ninth Amendment
"lends strong support to the view that the 'liberty' protected by the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal Government or the States is not
restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments." 381 U.S. at
493 (citation omitted). See also Ringold, The History of the Enactment of the Ninth
Amendment and Its Recent Developings, 8 TULSA L.J. 1 (1972); Kutner, The Neg-
lected Ninth Amendment: The 'Other Rights' Retained By the People, 51 MARQ. L.
REV. 121 (1968); Bertelsman, The Ninth Amendment and Due Process of Law-
Toward a Viable Theory of Unenumerated Rights, 37 U. CIN. L. Ruv. 777 (1968).
"The reference in the Ninth Amendment to rights retained by the people rather than
those granted by the government serves as a direct philosophical link to the concept
expressed a few years earlier in the Declaration of Independence that men are 'en-
dowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights."' Fields, Privacy "Rights" and
The New Oregon Criminal Code, 51 ORE. L. REv. 494, 499 (1972).
112. 381 U.S. at 486.
113. Id. at 494, quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1960) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting). Justice Goldberg also noted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and stated that it "protects those liberties that are 'so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' 381 U.S. at 487,
quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See also Pound, The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Right of Privacy, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 34, 54-55 (1961);
cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
114. 381 U.S. at 499, 502.
115. The district court had held that Life, working in conjunction with law enforce-
ment officials, violated Dietemann's federal constitutional rights, and based its deci-
sion on Griswold, stating "that although freedom of speech and freedom of press are
constitutional guaranties, so is the right of privacy." 284 F. Supp. at 929.
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Fourth Amendment, and nevertheless obtain relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for violation of his privacy. A violation of the Civil Rights
Act occurs when an individual is deprived of constitutional rights
by persons acting under "color of state law."'10 While many invasions
of privacy would ordinarily not involve a search or a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,11 7 an "intrusion" seems by its
very name to fall into that category. Therefore, unless the general
right to privacy is embodied in a constitutional provision which is
stricter than the Fourth Amendment, no recovery would appear possi-
ble. In Dietemann there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment be-
cause the "search and seizure" was not unreasonable, 1 8 and since Gris-
wold, the constitutional right of privacy has not been expanded beyond
those rights considered fundamental. But two years before Griswold
was decided, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in York v.
Story" ' upheld a cause of action under section 1983, stating that
plaintiff's constitutional right of privacy had been invaded, and that
"such acts constituted an arbitrary intrusion upon the security of her
privacy, as guaranteed to her by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.'12 0  The York decision, when coupled with
116. See Note, Federal-State Relations and Section 1983, 24 S. CAR. L. REV. 101,
103 (1972); Note, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Protection of Federal
Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 839 (1964). In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945),
a southern sheriff acting under color of state law beat a Negro until he died. And
see W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMIZAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LiBER-
aXEs 1019-20 (3d ed. 1970), for a discussion of how far the "color of law" por-
tion of section 1983 should be extended. The California Supreme Court, in Stapleton
v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1968), held that
where a private party willfully participates in a joint activity with a state agent, the
constitutional prohibitions apply to both. Therefore, in California, where a private party
joins and acts with a state officer, he acts "under color of state law." Also see
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966).
The Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches by private individuals. Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); see Sackler v. Sackler, 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224
N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. 1962), rev'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61, aff'd, 15
N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964); cf. People v. Botts, 250 Cal.
App. 2d 478, 482, 58 Cal. Rptr. 412, 415 (1967). The decision which led to the
Fourth Amendment, Entick v. Carrington, 19 St. Trials 1030, 1066 (1765), enunciated
the view that there is an absolute right of privacy against all intruders, official and
private.
117. For instance, those invasions involving the elements of publication, such as
false light in the public eye and public disclosure of private facts.
118. See text accompanying notes 91-96 supra.
119. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
120. Id. at 456 (emphasis added). Police officers had taken nude photographs of a
woman who had come to the police station seeking aid, and then circulated them
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Griswold, points the way toward an expanding right of privacy as a
necessary check on the police and on society's increasing demands for
the subordination of individuals to a highly technological and compu-
terized society. However, as has been noted previously, 121 exactly
where in the constitutional scheme the right to privacy stands is a sub-
ject of disagreement.
Nevertheless, California is recognizing a growing right to privacy. That
privacy itself is felt to be of constitutional dimensions, if not more
fundamental, is evidenced by the recent initiative ballot measure
adopted by the California voters.1 2 Privacy in California is not merely
protected against state action, but is considered an inalienable right
which may not be violated by anyone. This right of privacy must not
be swallowed up by overindulgence of the rights to freedom of speech
and of the press. The Dietemann decision, allowing recovery for
intrusion on the right of privacy without requiring proof of a trespass,
special damages or publication, 23 should afford a needed weapon for
among other police personnel. Whether the action of the officers would have consti-
tuted a prohibited search or seizure was not considered by the court.
In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), police officers broke into plaintiff's home
at night, without a warrant, and forced him to stand naked in the middle of the living
room while they searched the house. The Supreme Court allowed recovery under
section 1983, holding that the illegal search was a violation of plaintiff's constitutionl
rights, and stated:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the [Civil Rights Act] was passed was to
afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion,
neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims
of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies. Id. at 180.
See Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARv.
L. REv. 1486 (1969). And see Baker v. Howard, 419 F.2d 376, 377 (9th Cir. 1969)
(per curiam), where the court, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965), and York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 454-55 (9th Cir. 1963), said: "Under
some circumstances there can be such a gross abuse of privacy as to amount to an
abridgement of fundamental constitutional guarantees."
121. See notes 109-15 and accompanying text supra.
122. See note 37 supra. California is not the only state to include privacy in a con-
stitutional provision. See, e.g., State v. Kantner, 493 P.2d 306, 314 (Haw. 1972)
(Levinson, J., dissenting), which discusses Hawaii's recent constitutional revision elevat-
ing the right to be free from invasions of privacy to constitutional stature equal to the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
123. Notwithstanding that publication is not an essential element of plaintiffs case,
it was indicated by the Dietemann court of appeals that the publication after the tor-
tious intrusion might be an additional element for consideration in assessing damages.
The court said:
No interest protected by the First Amendment is adversely affected by per-
mitting damages for intrusion to be enhanced by the fact of later publication of the
information that the publisher improperly acquired. Assessing damages for the
additional emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff when the wrongfully ac-
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the preservation and protection of the individual's privacy in today's
society with its ever-increasing ability to intrude on seclusion and
solitude.
Allan E. Wilion
quired data are purveyed to the multitude chills intrusive acts. It does not chill
freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. A rule forbidding the
use of publication as an ingredient of damages would deny to the injured plaintiff
recovery for real harm done to him without any countervailing benefit to the
legitimate interest of the public in being informed. The same rule would encourage
conduct by news media that grossly offends ordinary men. 449 F.2d at 250.
